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The Russian Communist revolution,1 directed against the prop-
erty rights-of the "non-labouring" classes, succeeded in overturn-
ing the existing economic order in Russia by means of sweeping
legislation nationalizing, -ithout compensation to the former
owners, industry, banking, insurance, and shipping.2 Corporate
1 On November 7, 1917, the Communists overthrew the Kerensky Provi-
sional Government which had succeeded that of the Tsar.
2 Specimen decrees affecting various businesses are given below:
Decrees Nationalizing Manufacturing Companies:
The Decree of June 15, 1918, declared the "hereinafter mentioned indus-
trial and trading concerns . . . .with all their capital and properties,
whatever form they might be in, the property of the Russian Socialist
Federated Republics . .."
"Until further special action .... the concerns herein declared the prop-
erty of the R. S. F. S. R. are to be regarded as gratuitously leased to tho
former owners; the boards of directors and former owners finance them as
before and also receive income from them as before."
The Decree of November 29, 1920 declared: "1. All industrial under-
takings in the hands of private owners or companies, employing over five
workers and using motor power, or employing ten workers without motor
power, are declared nationalized."
"All the property, the affairs and capital of the concerns referred to in
paragraph 1, wherever this property is located and in whatever form it is,
is declared the property of the R. S. F. S. R."
The Decree of December 10, 1921, defined nationalization as being in
effect: "(1) If the property has been taken over by an agency of the Gov-
ernment pursuant to the above decree or any equivalent decree; (2) if the
management of the company has been taken over, or managers appointed;
(3) if the operation or planning of the property is actually conducted at the
expense of the Government." B. S. MALTrZMAN, LEGISLATION REGARDING IN-
DUSTRY, TRADE, LABOR AND TRANSPORT (1923) 50 (Russihn).
Decrees Nationalizing Banking Companies:
The Decree of December 14, 1917:
"In the interests of the proper organization of national economic life, of
the resolute eradication of banking and speculation, and of the complete
liberation of the workers, peasants, and the whole labouring population from
exploitation by banking capital...
1. Banking is declared a State monopoly.
2. All existing joint stock banks and banking houses are amalgamated
with the State Bank.
3. The assets and liabilities of the liquidated banks are taken over by
the State Bank.
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activity was brought to an abrupt end, the property and assets
in Russia of the private corporations affected by the decrees were
transferred to the State, shares of stock were seized, directors
and shareholders meetings suspended. Abroad, fugitive direc-
tors and shareholders of the nationalized Russian companies
have made various attempts to reconstitute themselves in an
effort to salvage bank deposits and credits which Soviet agents
have not been able to reach.3 In the numerous suits which have
4. The method of amalgamation of joint stock banks with the State
Bank shall be determined by a special decree."
The Decree of January 26, 1918:
"1. The share capital (stock, reserve and special) of former joint stock
banks are transferred to the State Bank of the Russian Republic on the
b'asis of complete confiscation.
2. All bank shares are declared null and void, and payment of dividends
of any kind whatsoever is unconditionally stopped.
3. All bank shares must forthwith be surrendered by the present holders
to the local branches of the State Bank.
4. The holders of bank shares which they cannot produce must submit
to the branches of the State Bank register records of the shares in their
holding indicating their exact whereabouts.
5. The holders of bank shares who have failed to surrender them in
accordance with paragraph 3 or to submit register records of their shares
in accordance with paragraph 4, within a period of two weeks following
the day of the publication of the present decree, are punished by confisca-
tion of all their property.
6. All transactions and deeds of transfer referring to bank shares are
unconditionally prohibited. Persons taking part in such prohibited trans-
actions and deeds are punished with imprisonment up to three years."
The R. S. F. S. R. Constitution, July 10, 1918, c. II, § 3:
"(e) There is confirmed the passing of all the banks into the ownership
of the Workmen-Peasants' State as one of the conditions of the emancipa-
tion of the labouring masses from beneath the yoke of capital . . ." Rus-
sian Comm. & Ind. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925) A. C.
112, 120.
The Decree Nationalizing Insurance Companies:
The Decree of December 1, 1918:
"1. Insurance of all kinds and forms, such as insurance against fire,
insurance of transport, life, against accidents, hail, epizooty, bad crops,
etc.; is declared to be the monopoly of the State. Note: Mutual insurance of
movable property and goods by co-operative organizations is carried out on
a special basis.
2. All private insurance companies and organizations (joint stock share
and mutual) are subject to liquidation on the publication of the present
decree; former Zemstvo (Popular Soviets') and mutual-municipal insurance
organizations, operating within the boundaries of the Russian Republic,
are declared to be the property of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
Republic?" First Russian Ins. Co. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., [1928]
1 Ch. 922, 934.
3The variety and amount of assets belonging to Russian corporations in
foreign countries is incalculable. The surplus funds of Russian insurance
companies in New York state alone has been said to aggregate $6,000,000.
New York Times, May 30, 1930. The number of cases cited here from six
or seven countries also indicates to some extent the volume of claims in-
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been brought before foreign tribunals the unprecedented
character of many of the questions involved, entangled
as they are with importunate political, economic, as well
as legal considerations, has produced considerable confusion of
reasoning. But although contradictory theories have been em-
ployed by the courts of different countries, and sometimes by
the courts within the same jurisdiction, the resolution of the
ultimate question, whether the Soviet government or the former
owners are entitled to the property, has been answered with
surprising unanimity. The conclusion is forced upon one that
even where the Soviet government has been granted political
recognition,' the courts have, as a whole, strongly favored the
former owvners. In so doing they have given effect to a public
policy which, in all non-socialistic countries, dictates a repudia-
tion of communistic legislation.
volved. The following quotation furnishes an intriguing illustration of the
variety of situations which have and are likely to arise:
"A perplexing problem, involving questions both of the effect of Soviet
legislation and of State succession, is promised in Palestine. Certain Rus-
sian religious corporations, in particular, the Orthodox Palestine Society
and the. Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, owned before the war extensive
properties in the Holy Land, and built a number of churches, religious
hostels, and hospices in the holy cities and in the neighborhood of holy
sites. Local representatives of the societies in Palestine have continued to
administer these properties since the war and claim that the sQcieties' own-
ership is unimpaired. The Soviet Government, however, has claimed that, in
virtue of a decree of the Council of the People's Commissaries of January
28. 1918, these Russian societies have been wound up, and their movable
and immovable property recognized as the property of the Soviet State.
The Government, therefore, declares that all the lands, hospitals and other
buildings, and in general all other movable and immovable property of the
said societies at Jerusalem, Nazareth, Haifa and Beirut and other places in
Palestine or elsewhere, constitute the property of the Russian State. At
the same time, they declare null and void all transactions which may have
taken place in respect of such property without their consent and approval.
"The Russian societies, although called Imperial, and normally having as
their President a member of the Imperial family, were quite independent of
the State; and the question which may have to be considered is the effect
of these decrees of the Soviet Government in dissolving the societies. No
legal action has yet been brought in the courts of Palestine either by or
against the Russian societies, so that the question of their legal status has
not yet come up for judicial determination." Bentwich, The Soviet Govern-
ment and Russian Property in Foreign Countries (1924) BR. YEARBOOK OF
INT. LAW 84. It would be interesting to see how the avowedly atheistic
government of Russia would fare before the World Court, as Mr. Bent-
wich suggests, in seeking possession of some of the most holy shrines of
Christendom.
The principal countries which have recognized the Soviet government
de jure are: Germany, April 16, 1922; Great Britain, February 1, 1924;
Italy, February 7, 1924; France, October 28, 1924; Japan, January 1, 1925.
Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and the United States have never recognized
the Soviet government. THE RECOGNITION POLICY Of THE UNITED STATES,
Information Service, For. Pol. Ass. (1926) 18.
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The problem has been presented before the courts of various
countries in somewhat different settings. In the United States,
the fact that the Soviet government has not been recognized has
been a factor of considerable influence upon the attitude of the
courts. Thus, as one of the results of non-recognition the Soviet
government was denied capacity to sue in American courts.3
The view was also taken in several early cases that the decrees
of an unrecognized state were without effect in the United
States.0 It is clear that such a principle - would permit Russian
corporations to continue unimpaired in the enjoyment of their
5 The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294 (N. D. Cal. 1920), 279 Fed. 130 (N. D. Cal.
1920) (libel against a vessel); The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y. 1921)
(semble); Russian Republic (R. S. F. S. R.) v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 235.
139 N. E. 259 (1923). For purposes of recovering assets of the Russian
State in the United States, the former financial representative of the
Kerensky government represents the Russian government. Lehigh Valley R.
R. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), certiorari denied,
275 U. S. 571, 48 Sup. Ct. 159 (1927). Likewise the Soviet Government
may not be made party defendant in a tort action for illegal seizure of
property in Russia. Wulfsohn v. Russian Government (R. S. F. S. R.),
234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923), reargument denied, 235 N. Y. 579, 139
N. E. 742 (1923); commented on in (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 534; (1922) 35
HARV. L. REV. 768. But title was allowed to be set up in the Soviet Govern-
ment as a defense to an action by the former owner of a gold shipment.
Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
6 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 91T (1924),
where the defense of nationalization of the bank's assets in Russia was
rejected by the court in a suit by a depositor who had agreed to accept pay-
ment there. The court said: "Courts of high repute have held that
confiscation by a government to which recognition has been refused has no
other effect in law than seizure by bandits or by other lawless bodies." 239
N. Y. at 164, 145 N. E. at 918. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 211
App. Div. 132, 207 N. Y. Supp. 574 (3d Dep't 1925) ; Bourne v. Bourne, 240
N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925). See James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co.. 247 N. Y.
262, 269, 160 N. E. 364, 366 (1928): "We have never recognized that gov-
ernment. Its decrees are treated as nullity except in so far as there is
need to recognize them for the purpose of promoting justice." A similar
limitation upon the stringency with which this theory is to be applied was
suggested in Sokoloff v. National City Bank, s'qna.
7 The view has been attacked by Dickinson, R'cent Recognition Cacer
(1925) 19 Am. J. IN'T. L. 263; Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in
America (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 499: and Fraenkel, The Juri-tic Status of
Foreign States, Their Propcrt': .,ad Their Acts (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 544,
on the grounds that the absence of political recognition cannot affect the
question of private rights dependant upon the internal operation of Russian
law. The opposite view is urged by European authorities. TFE."Au, L'EXis-
TENTCE A L'rETPANGER DES sOCITeS RUSSES (1928). See also Houghton, The
Validity of the Acts of UnrecognizEd de facto Governments in the Courtz of
Non-recognized States (1929) 13 .i1qN. L. REv. 216, and The Position, of
Unrecognized Governments Before the Courts of Foreign States (1929) 4
IND. L. J. 445. A full discussion of the implications of this question is im-
possible in the compass of this article. But see notes 76, 77, 78, 79 and 80
infra.
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rights and privileges as foreign corporations in the United
States so long as the Soviet government remained unrecognized.
In the case of Russiacn Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard,8 however,
a change took place in the courts' view of the problem. The rea-
sons for this shift were threefold: the feeling that despite the
absence of political recognition, a more realistic view ought to
be taken of what had occurred in Russia; the criticism of com-
mentators who argued that the theory employed by the earlier
decisions was incorrect; 9 and the fear that, in some of the
growing number of countries which had recognized the Soviet
government, the debtors of Russian companies compelled to pay
in the United States might be subjected to double liability.10
In the Stoddard case the New York Court of Appeals refused
to assume jurisdiction in a suit brought by fugitive directors of
a Russian insurance company to recover a statutory deposit made
under the insurance law of New York. The decision was based
upon a denial of the competency of the directors to act for the
corporation, and, more directly, upon the danger to the defend-
ant of a second suit by the Soviet government in a country where
it had been recognized. In his discussion of the case Judge
Lehman drew some far-reaching conclusions with reference to
the effect that should be granted by American courts to Soviet
legislation. The view of the earlier cases that the problem
hinged purely upon political recognition was passed over. The
private rights and obligations of individuals affected by Soviet
legislation, he declared, presented a judicial, not a political ques-
tion; moreover, the absence of political recognition should not
blind the courts to the actual state of affairs in Russia:
"The courts in considering that question assume as a premise
that until recognition these acts are not in full sense law. Their
conclusion must depend upon whether these have nevertheless
had such an actual effect that they may not be disregarded." "I
After a critical examination of the history of the plaintiff com-
pany with a view to determining the "actual" effect of the na-
tionalization decrees, Judge Lehman concluded that the com-
pany, if it existed at all in the forum, was an abstraction rather
than an actuality and in Russia was certainly without existence.
Under these circumstances, to permit recovery by the plaintiffs
would be contrary to "common sense and justice." While this
decision did not expressly overrule the former theory, in ascrib-
8 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
9 Particularly Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 7, which was published a few
days before the decision in the Stoddard case was rendered.
'
0 Supra note 4. It will be noted that a number of states recognized the
Soviet Government in 1924 immediately prior to the Stoddard case.
'a Supra note 8, at 158, 147 N. E. at 705.
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ing some legal consequence to the actual results of Soviet legisla-
tion, it seemed, as Judge Crane pointed out in his dissent, to be
doing by indirection what the court had said it would not do di-
rectly. The pragmatic approach, however, met with the approval
of commentators -' and a similar line of reasoning was employed
in several subsequent decisions.123 Why then, may it be asked, did
the New York Court-of Appeals repudiate the reasoning of the
Stoddard case in its latest decision of Petrogradsky Meiduna-
rodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank? "
The facts of the Mejdunarodny case are very similar to those
of the Stoddard case. The plaintiff, a Russian bank, as repre-
sented in the suit by three survivors of the last board of direc-
tors, sought to recover a deposit in the defendant bank. The
court held that a recovery must 'be allowed. In reaching this
conclusion Chief Judge Cardozo came to grips with the three
outstanding issues of the problem:
(1) Could the corporation sue in New York despite its na-
tionalization by the Soviet government?
(2) Had the directors, who brought the suit, authority to act
in behalf of the corporation?
(3) Was there a risk that the debtor would be made to pay
12 Dickinson, The Russian Reinsurance Company Cases (1925) 19 AM. J.
INT. L. 753; (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 98; (1925) 11 CoRv. L. Q. 99; and some
of the articles cited supra note 7. Criticism was severe, however, by Scheftel
(1925) 52 CLUNET 1074, who described the decision as a "denial of justice
inspired by political apprehensions... It would be difficult to find another
precedent, where a national tribunal had refused to apply the principles of
established law because of their incompatibility with the political concep-
tions and the jurisprudence of foreign states."
- Severnoe Securities Corp. v. Westminster Bank, 214 App. Div. 14, 210
N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1925). This decision goes to the extent of citing
the Mulhouse decision in the House of Lords, supra, note 2, and then going
on to say: "The record here shows . .. [that] all Russian insurance com-
panies were destroyed by the Soviet government and their properties con-
fiscated. If that situation be recognized in England, plus the further rec-
ognition by the British government of the de facto character of the Soviet
government of Russia, it is exceedingly difficult to say here and now that
a suit will not lie in England by and on behalf of the Soviet government
against the defendant.. ." 214 App. Div. at 19, 210 N. Y. Supp. at 634.
How this doubt could be read into the Mulhouse case is difficult to com-
prehend. Compare also Banque International de Commerce de Petrograd
v. National City Bank, 133 Misc. 527, 233 N. Y. Supp. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1929)
(lower court decision in the Mejdunarodny case). But the Stoddard case
was distinguished in First Russian Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 212 App. Div. 841,
207 N. Y. Supp. 837 (3d Dep't 1925), ajf'd, 240 N. Y. 601, 148 N. E. 72Z
(1925), reargument denied, 240 N. Y. 643, 148 N. E. 740 (1925). Since
the Superintendent of Insurance held the property in this case there could
be no danger of a second recovery against him in another jurisdiction. Judge
Pound in the dissent, however, argued that the company was in fact non-
existent.
24253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930).
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the debt over again to the Soviet government in a country where
recognition had been accorded?
In the following discussion of these three issues, the decisions
of the American and foreign courts will be brought together in
order to compare the views that have been held on each of
the above questions and to discover the significance of the
Me.idu-narodny case in the treatment of the assets of nationalized
Russian corporations.
CAN A RUSSIAN CORPORATION SUE IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION
DESPITE ITS NATIONALIZATION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT?
The usual defense to actions brought by nationalized Russian
corporations in both American and foreign courts has been the
plea that the corporation no longer exists and therefore cannot
appear before the court as a party to a suit. The issue is thus
at the outset presented in a manner leading most naturally into
a consideration of legal abstractions concerning the continued
existence of a corporate personality despite the vicissitudes of
its career subsequent to the decrees of nationalization. But
the opportunity is not lacking for the courts to consider the eco-
nomic and social consequences of their decision, and, as has been
observed, there is a strong temptation to deny effect to Soviet
legislation wherever reasons can be found for doing so. The
ingenuity of the courts is testified by the profusion and by
the variety of theories used to achieve this result.
Where an alleged foreign corporation seeks to sue, or is sued,
the courts will ordinarily look to the laws of the state of incor-
poration to determine whether it is a corporation. As Holds-
worth has said: "corporate life and form . . . cannot exist
without the permission of the state, express, presumed or
implied." - This premise, which is indeed the prevailing theory
of Anglo-American law, appears in the Restatement of the
Conflicts of Laws as follows:
"If a corporation is dissolved by the state of incorporation,
another state will recognize that the association has ceased to
have legal personality; and if the exercise of legal personality
is suspended by the state of incorporation, this suspension will
be recognized in another state." "
The argument against allowing the corporation to sue, there-
fore, starts with the proposition that effect must be given to
'16 9 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 48; see Dewey, The
Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
655.
le CONFLICTS OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, § 167.
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the laws of the foreign state, whether it be recognized or not
It is insisted not only that the Soviet decrees have dissolved the
corporations in Russia but that the companies have ceased to
exist in fact as well as law. The majority of American, English
and French courts, however, despite this argument based upon
what appears to be accepted doctrine, have allowed Russian cor-
porations to sue in the forum. In order to meet the arguments
advanced by parties claiming that the corporation has ceased to
exist, four distinct theories have been used:
First, in countries where recognition has not been accorded
to the Soviet government, legal effect may be denied the decrees.
Second, in countries where the Soviet government has
been recognized and the decrees are accepted as the law applic-
able to the question it may be argued that by their very terms
the decrees do not dissolve the Russian corporations.
Third, the Holdsworth premise may be qualified as follows:
where the corporation in question has reconstituted itself in the
forum it is to be regarded as a de facto corporation and beyond
the reach of the legislation of its country of origin, though cor-
porations not having a de facto existence in the forum are to be
regarded as dissolved.
Finally, a fourth possibility presents itself, that of denying the
Holdsworth premise altogether and simply allowing the corpor-
ation to sue in the forum on the ground that it is primarily a
power for the forum rather than the state of incorporation to
concede, if its public policy so requires.
American Decisions. The first method of evading the na-
tionalization decrees and finding that the corporate existence
has not been terminated was employed generally prior to the
Stoddard decision by American courts. But in that case the
assumption that absence of recognition alone was a sufficient
ground upon which to circumvent the Holdsworth premise was
severely attacked. The -importance of the Mejdunarodny de-
cision lies in the manner in which it meets the reasoning of the
Stoddard case on this point.
In effect the contention of Chief Judge Cardozo is that, even
assuming that the Soviet decrees were intended to extinguish
the life of the corporation in question, the courts of a foreign
state are not obliged to give them such effect:
"There is a distinction, not to be ignored between the life
of a human being and the life of a persont ficta, the creature
of the State. When a human being dies, his death is equally a
fact whether it was brought about legally or illegally. . . .
The event is not conditioned by the juristic quality of the cause.
But in respect of juristic beings, the quality of the cause may
determine the event as well. The personality may continue un-
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impaired until law rather than might shall declare it at an
end." 1*1
It is not quite clear from this reasoning whether Chief Judge
Cardozo has abandoned the theory of non-recognition as a suffi-
cient ground in itself for denying effect to the decrees. But
there are strong indications in another passage of the opinion
that he finds support for refusing the decrees any application
in the present instance on the grounds of public policy, an argu-
ment which verges on the fourth of the theories enumerated
above. The decrees, it is contended, will be given effect only
where the public policy of the forum requires that this should
be done. But, he declares, there is no shelter in this exception
for rapine and oppression:
"We do not recognize the decrees of Soviet Russia as compe-
tent to divest the plaintiff of the title to any assets that would
otherwise have the protection of our law. At least this must
be so where the title thus divested is transferred to the very
government not recognized as existent." "I
It might be suggested that this fourth ground would alone
be sufficient to achieve the result. Is not the problem essentially
that of the powers which the forum shall confer upon the persons
before it? The habit of looking to the country of origin of the
corporation for guidance as to the treatment to be accorded to
it is limited by the public policy of the forum when the purpose
of the association is illegal in the forum. Why then cannot
the forum also determine for itself whether a foreign corpora-
tion has the power to sue in its own courts without being bound
by the conclusions reached as to this matter abroad?
But even granting that the corporation may not have been
dissolved by a competent legal authority, the reasoning of the
Stoddard case still remained to be met. Had not the physical
changes attending the decrees, whatever their legal nature, pro-
duced such an "actual effect" that the corporation no longer
possessed the power to sue? This was considered by Judge
Cardozo in the following portion of his opinion:
'7 Supra note 14, at 30, 170 N. E. at 481.
18 Ibid. 29, 170 N. E. at 481. The passages quoted above might
be compared with the opinion rendered by the same judge in Fred S. James
& Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925),
where the defense advanced by a Russian corporation of extinguishment by
Soviet decree was rejected for much the same reason: "We deal now
with the single question whether the defendant has an existence sufficient to
subject it to suit in the domestic forum. That is a question which the law
of the forum will determine for itself . . " 239 N. Y. at 256, 146 N. E.
at 371.
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"The corporation once existing, the burden was on the de-
fendant to overthrow the presumption of continuance and to
show that life had ceased. We cannot say upon this record that
the burden has been borne. If we look to the analogies of our own
law, the conclusion is not doubtful. Neither bankruptcy, nor
cessation of business, nor dispersion of stockholders, nor the
absence of directors, nor all combined, will avail without more
to stifle the breath of juristic personality. The corporation
abides as an ideal creation, impervious to the shocks of these
temporal vicissitudes. Not even the sequestration of the assets
at the hands of a receiver will terminate its being." "I
From this reasoning it followed that, despite the legislation
which had resulted in stripping it of most of the attributes of
corporate activity, the Russian corporation still existed, at least
for the purpose of recovering its assets in New Y6rk. That this
treatment of the question is not entirely unprecedented is evident
from an examination of the cases in England.
English Decisians. By virtue of the fact that Great Britain
recognized the Soviet government as early as 1921 20 the use of
non-recognition as a theory upon which to base a refusal to give
full effect to the Soviet nationalization decrees has been un-
available to the English courts. The problems, however, have
been essentially the same as those facing the courts of the United
States. And the English decisions have not been at a loss to
find other theories in support of their conclusions.
Several of the early cases raising the issue of the competency
of a nationalized Russian corporation to sue were decided by the
King's Bench against the plaintiff corporation. Thus where a
Russian bank was attempting to collect from one of its debtors
the defense was raised that the bank had become extinct.- In
deciding that the plaintiff in fact and in law had ceased to exist,
Scrutton, L. J. declared:
"If the artificial person is destroyed in its country of origin,
the country whose law creates it as a person, it appears to me
it is destroyed everywhere as a person." --
Likewise, according to this view, it was impossible for a bank
which had tendered its debt to recover bonds deposited with the
defendant as security,23 or for a British creditor of a Russian
2 Supra note 14, at 31, 170 N. E. at 482. Citations to cases in the opinion
are omitted in the passage quoted.
20 De facto recognition took place by the Treaty of Commerce, March
16, 1921, (1928) 18 D9 MARTENS (3d) 684.
- Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow,
[1923] 2 K. B. 682.
-Ibid. 691.
23 Russian Comm. & Ind. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse,
[1923] 2 K. B. 630.
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company to garnish a debt owed to the non-existent company by
the defendant.24
On an appeal of the second of these cases to the House of
Lords, in Russian Comm. & Ind. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte
de Mulhouse,25 the holding of the lower court was reversed and
the Russian bank allowed to recover. By this decision the House
of Lords established the doctrine, which has not since been ques-
tioned by the English courts, that the decrees of the Soviet gov-
ernment did not dissolve the Russian companies but merely
seized their assets in Russia.2 6 This view, which represents the
second of the theories mentioned above, was summed up by
Lord Sumner in a later case as follows:
"In these decrees not only the word 'dissolution' but the thing
itself was carefully avoided, no doubt for solid practical
reasons." -
But, again granting that the decrees by their terms had not
extinguished the Russian corporations, the English courts also
found themselves still faced with the fact that the decrees, in
actual effect, had destroyed 'the coporations in Russia by
annulling shares, seizing assets, and terminating all business
activity. The point was met in England as it was recently met
by Chief Judge Cardozo. In dissenting from the lower court
decision in the Mulhouse case Judge Atkin declared:
"We are quite familiar in our law with the position that a com-
pany may lose all its assets, may have no directors administering
the affairs of the company, or have the powers of the directors
transferred in the course of liquidation to an officer of the court,
may have all its assets distributed amongst the shareholders,
and yet remain an entity until a formal dissolution." 21
This line of thought was later elaborated by Judge Wright:
"In any case, annulment of shares of stocks, whatever it may
24 Sea Insurance Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 17 Ll. L. R. 316 (1924).
25Supra note 2.
26 In the following cases various Soviet decrees were similarly construed:
Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, (1925]
A. C. 150 (bank); The "Jupiter," [1927] P. D. 250 (navigation com-
pany); Woronin, Leutscheg & Cheshire v. Huth, K. B. Div. May 2, 1928
(unreported), see (1928) 55 CLUNET 756 for transcript of the case and
note (manufacturing company); First Russian Ins. Co. v. London & Lan-
cashire Ins. Co., supra note 2 (insurance company). Service upon the repre-
sentative of a Russian company in England was upheld in Sabatier v. The
Trading Co., [1927] 1 Ch. 495.
27Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co.,
[1927] A. C. 95, 108.
s Supra note 23, at 664.
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mean, would in my opinion not destroy the existence of the com-
pany . There is indeed no reference in the decrees now
being considered, to the liquidation of the companies; their en-
terprises were simply taken as going concerns. It may be that
in Russia the plaintiff company had no practical existence; that
its property in Russia was taken from it, and its statutes could
not have working effect; but I see no reason to find that as an
entity it was dissolved and I find that it was not dissolved but
still exists ,, 29
It is interesting to note that one English judge has expressed
doubts as to the validity of the premise that a dissolution of a
corporation by a foreign state is binding upon the forum- While
not going so far as to dissent on this ground from the lower
court decision in Bavque Intervationmle de Petrograd v. Goukas-
sow, Judge Atkin made the following interesting remarks:
"We are considering whether the alleged actor exists, and in
determining that issue, it appears to me that the Court must
apply its own law, the lex fori. Whether the plaintiff in an
English court is dead or alive would be determined on an issue
of fact by English evidence and procedure; and it appears to me
quite irrelevant to consider whether the Courts of the country
where he was domiciled or where the cause of action arose,
would hold him to be alive or dead." 30
But the judge goes on to say that on principle the plaintiff is
dead, and principle must be followed. While there are only dicta
attacking the prevailing Anglo-American doctrine on this issue,
these dicta appear to be based upon sounder thought than the
prevailing view itself, as applied to the question at hand. With-
out denying that Holdsworth's view as codified in the Restate-
ment is applicable in the ordinary run of cases, it would involve
no departure from the doctrine of stare decisis for the courts to
hold that the public policy of the forum admits of a modification
of the general principle in this sui generis situation.
In search of an additional reason to fortify its result in allow-
ing the Russian corporation to recover, the court in the Mul-
hou.§e case sought to establish an estoppel against the Soviet
government to deny that the decrees still permitted branches
of the corporations abroad to do business.31 This reasoning ap-
29 Woronin, Leutscheg & Cheshire v. Huth, supra note 26.
30 Supra note 21, at 693.
31 It was pointed out that as late as 1922 drafts were drawn by a Mutual
Credit society in Russia against the London branch of the supposedly na-
tionalized Russo-Asiatic Bank in favor of the Soviet Trade Delegation,
an official body representing the Soviet Government. These drafts were
honored and paid in London. See also First Russian Insurance Co. v. Lon-
don & Lancashire Insurance Co., supra note 2, holding that the Soviet de-
crees, while applying to all insurance companies in Russia, did not affect
the plaintiff's right to do business outside of Russia.
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proaches the third of the theories suggested above, namely, that
a corporation which has a de facto existence in the forum may
maintain suit. It has, however, been left undeveloped by the
English courts, the principle reliance upon the de facto theory
having been in France.
French Decisions. The French courts more frequently than
any others have had questions concerning Russian corporations
before them. The quantity of cases is explained in part by the
great number of Russian enterprises which had branches in
France and in part by the presence there of many refugee di-
rectors and shareholders of Russian companies. But the value
to us of the decisions is somewhat diminished by the fact that
under French law the courts are not competent to take jurisdic-
tion in all cases involving foreign corporations not authorized
to do business in France.32  In many cases, consequently, the
court has merely held itself incompetent to act, though under
similar circumstances in England or the United States a court
might have taken jurisdiction.
Prior to recognition of the Soviet government, which occurred
in 1924, 33 the French courts appear to have allowed no legal
validity to the Soviet decrees of nationalization.34 Since recog-
nition has been accorded, however, Russian corporations are
deemed to have been dissolved in Russia, and Russian corpora-
tions in France have been subjected, by order of the Procurator
of the Republic, to "provisional administration" and "measures
of conservation." 35 But this policy has not been carried to its
32 2 RoussFAu, Socifr S CommERcIALES (1921) 449: "It is the law at the
present time that while such companies cannot act as plaintiffs, they can be
brought before the French tribunals as defendants as de facto corporations
ss Supra note 4.
34 The Paris branch of a Russian bank was held liable on a draft drawn
by a subsequently nationalized branch of the same bank in Russia. 'Horn-
stein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Comm. Seine, April 15, 1924 (1927)
54 CLUNEr 1075; semble, Kharon v. Banque Russe pour le Commerce et
l'Industrie, Trib. Civil Seine, May 20, 1921 (1923) 50 CLuzNEr 533. In an
action by directors of a Russian company to recover deposits from the de-
fendant, the plaintiff was recognized as still an existing juristic person, but
the defense that the directors were not qualified to represent the company
was sustained. Banque Industrielle de Moscou v. Banque des Pays du Nord,
Trib. Civil Seine May 21, 1924 (1927) 54 CLUNEr 350. It was held that
the business of the company might be conducted in Paris, and shareholders'
meetings held at the new domicile were valid if a sufficient number of share-
holders were notified. Vlasto v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Comm.
Seine, April 26, 1922 (1923) 50 CLUNET 933. See Champcommunal, La con-
dition des Russes a 1'6tranger specialement en France (1924) 19 REv. DE
DL INT. Pa. 321, 525; see Grouber and Tager, Le point de vuc de la juris-
prudence francaise (1924) 51 CLUNE r 8.
35 Ordinances dated Oct. 22 and Nov. 29, 1924 (1925) 52 CLUNET 530.
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complete conclusion, for where the Russian companies have a
de facto existence in France, either by virtue of a branch office
or by reconstitution in some way, directors may be successful
in their claims against assets in France. Thus where a French
bank had been organized with funds belonging to a branch of a
Russian bank, neither the Soviet nationalization decrees nor the
above-mentioned ordinances of the French government affected
it. 3 0 And where the Paris branch of a Russian bank had be-
come "the center of its activities" and had "lost the character
of a branch," 37 or where a private corporation had acquired a
domicile de facto in France ss the same result has been obtained.
On the other hand where the Russian company is unable to show
proof of any de facto existence in France, it cannot sue its debt-
oxs before the French courts.3 9 In several decisions there seems
to have been a departure from the theory of dc facto corpora-
tions but such departure now appears to have terminated.40
See Andr&Prudhomme, La Reconnaissanco en France du gouvernement des
Soviets et ses Consiquences juridiqueis (1925) 52 CLuNnr 318.
-a Banque gin~rale pour: le commerce 6tranger v. Jaudon, Trib. Civil
Seine, December 23, 1924 (1925) 52 CLUNET 419.
Z7 Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Civil Seine, March 23, 1925 (1927) 54
CLuNur 352; Banque Russe pour le Commerce Etranger, Trib. Civil Seine,
'May 3, 1926 (1927) 54 CLUNEr 358.
3s Selikman v. Soc. de Naphte de Bakou, Trib. Comm. Seine, April 12,
1926 (1927) 54 CLuNrn 357 (Russian company set up defense of tte court's
lack of jurisdiction, it being a foreign company). Scinble, Teslenko v.
Banque Russo-Asiatique, Cour de Paris, July 22, 1929 (1929) 56 CLUN=r
1110; National City Bank v. Renault Russe, Trib. Comm. Seine, July 12,
1929 (1929) 56 CLuNrE 1122. See discussion of Mazeaud, De la Nation-
aliti des Socidtis (1928) 55 CLuxNr 30.
-9 Nord de moscou v. Phenix Espagnol, Trib. de Paris, June 13, 1928
(1929) 56 CLUNET 119; Banque de Sib~rie v. Vairon, Cour de Bordeaux,
January 2, 1928 (1929) 56 CLUNET 115. But compare Zelenoff v. Banque
de Commerce de Sib~rie, Cour d'appel de Paris, January 31, 1928 (1928) 55
CLUxur 679, where in a suit against the same company the court gave
judgment for the plaintiff.
4 Where the plaintiffs, creditors of a Russian bank, have sought to en-
force their claims against the Paris branch of the bank, rome of the deci-
sions even after recognition of the Soviet Government by the French Gov-
ernment have held the branch not liable for debts of the principal office on
the theory that the principal office still had a legal existence in Russia.
Karagoulian v. Banque Russe pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, Cour de
Paris, May 17, 1927 (1928) 55 CLuNET 131; Rabinovitch v. Banque Russe
pour le Commerce Etranger, Trib. Comm. Seine, 'May 15, 1925 (1927) 54
CLNET 354; Dame Krivitzky v. Banque Russe pour le Commerce Etranger,
Trib. Comm. Seine, November 19, 1927 (1928) 55 CLuNnr 132. But in
Zelenoff v. Banque de Commerce de Sibirie, supra note 39, the court re-
fused to follow the above decisions and held the branch bank liable on the
grounds that it had in fact acquired a domicile in France and could not
escape liability by referring creditors to the non-existing principal office
in Russia. Cf. Kahn v. Soc. d'assurances Rossia, Cour d'appel de Paris,
March 8, 1928 (1928) 55 CLUNEr 682.
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The French doctrine has the disadvantage of preventing the
collection of debts by the Russian companies which have not been
successful in establishing their de facto character. This, in
effect, makes a gift of the debt to the debtor, a result that seems
even less justifiable than placing the funds in the hands of a min-
ority of the former directors and shareholders of the company.
The harshness of the doctrine has been somewhat mitigated
by a certain leniency in finding the formation of a de facto cor-
poration, as well as by the expedient suggested by one court,
in rejecting the demand of directors, that a liquidator or a judi-
cial administrator be appointed to hold the assets.41 But the
French courts have not regarded the act of dissolution, as distin-
guished from the confiscation of assets, as contrary to the public
policy of the forum. In deciding otherwise the New York Court
of Appeals in the Mejdunarodny case would appear to have
achieved a more desirable result. For the purpose of collecting
debts abroad it would certainly seem feasible to hold that the
company still existed, and this result can be reached whether
recognition has" or has not been accorded to the nationalizing
government.
German Decisions. There have been very few decisions in
Germany with reference to claims to the assets of nationalized
Russian corporations. But one case was so hotly contested be-
fore the Kammergericht that German jurisprudence upon the
question has been considerably clarified. In Ginsberg v. Deutsche
Bank,42 creditors of a Russian corporation sought recovery of a
debt by attaching the deposit of the Russian company in the
Deutsche Bank. In defense it was urged that, since the company
had been dissolved as a legal entity in Russia, there was no
longer any debtor and consequently no debt. On appeal, the
Kammergericht reversed the holding of the lower court, and
granted the creditor an attachment. In rendering its decision
the court declared:
"The decree must be regarded as a political declaration an-
nouncing a program for the future, not as a law having immedi-
41 Nord de Moscou v. Phenix Espagnol, supra note 39; approved by Picard
and Tager (1929) 56 CLUNEr 131, 133: "In fact, since the company may
have assets abroad, which are not reached by the decrees of nationalization
in so far as they expropriate without compensation, it survives until disso-
lution for two reasons. First, as a de facto company . . .. In the second
place, if the company is not continuing as a de facto company, it must be
recognized as existing at least for purposes of liquidation. This is a rule
of our law which the tribunals have not hesitated to apply to nationalized
Russian companies."
42 Kammergericht, Berlin, March 3, 1925 (1925) 1 OSTRECHT 163.
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ate effect, and referring to a future decree for the annihilation
of the banks. But no such decree was ever executed." 43
The decision was severely criticized by Dr. Wohl," who took
the position that the Russian banks were dissolved despite the
fact that no decree of nationalization mentions the dissolution
of joint stock companies. He contends that the decrees which
radically transformed the whole economic order in the direction
of pure state ownership did not halt "directly in the face of the
fictitious-according to the prevailing Russian theory-juristic
personality of the joint stock companies."
On a rehearing the Kammergericht reversed its former view,
giving judgment against the plaintiff creditor of the Russian
bank. The decrees, it declared, destroyed the legal entity of the
Russian bank and so left nothing which the plaintiff could sue.
The question of the continuation of the corporate entity was
discussed by the court as follows:
"In the previous suit this question was answered by the state-
ment that it could not be established with certainty whether a
legal nationalization of the Russian banks had taken place with
the effect that the said banks had thereby lost their legal per-
sonality. However, this opinion can no longer be upheld today.
Professor Schondorf's consultation on this subject shows that
the decree of 14th December 1917, which was published on 17th
December 1917, must be construed not only as a political dec-
laration but as an act of nationalization. The nationalization
involved not only a confiscation of the property of the, banks,
but also the loss of their legal personality, since the former pri-
vate banks have now been transformed into Departments of the
Peoples (State) Bank; their organization was completely de-
stroyed. This destruction must also be held valid for the terri-
tory of the German Reich. The bank cannot exist in Germany
when it no longer exists in Russia. Nothing different can be
understood under Article 30 of EGBGB." '
Thus the German courts, in denying that the corporation has
continued as a legal entity capable of suing in the German courts,
have swung to a position opposed in principle to that of the
recent English and American decisions.
Swiss Decisions. As the German, so the Swiss courts have
considered but few cases bearing upon the nationalized Russian
corporations. In an early decision 40 it was held that the Mejdun-
4Ibid. 164.
-Wohl, The Nationalization of Joint Stock Banking Corporations in
Soviet Russia (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 385, 527, 622, originally published
in (1925) 1 OsTRECnHT 26, 113, 163. This article was answered by Rabin-
owitsch, Das auslndische Verm6gen der in Sowjctrusazland nationais-rtm
Unternehmungen (1926) 2 OsmCT 1168.
45 (1928) JURISTISCHE WOCHE NSCHRIFr 1232.
Comptoire d'Escornpte v. Sosnowice, Trib. de Geneve, November 22,
1920 (1921) SEMAME JUDICIARE 82.
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arodny Bank might still be represented by its former directors.
But in the case of Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petro-
grad v. Hausner, where the same bank appeared as plaintiff,
the Federal Tribunal reversed the holding of the lower court in
favor of the plaintiff upon the ground that the legal status of a
branch of a corporation depended upon that of the principal
office, and that the absence of recognition by Switzerland did
not prevent Russian law from operating in Russia. If the prin-
cipal office had ceased to exist, it was argued, the branch also
ceased to have any juridical personality. Holdsworth's theory
of the corporation finds expression in the following sentence of
the opinion:
"The existence of the branch, as such depends . . upon
that of the principal office, the existence of a branch being im-
possible without the principal office upon which this secondary
place of business depends . . . Thus if their [the decrees]
effect is such as to terminate the existence of the principal office
in Petrograd, the existence of a branch capable of taking legal
action in Switzerland will not be admitted." 47
Thus. the highest tribunal in Switzerland denied any legal per-
sonality to the plaintiff corporation and, on rehearing, 48 affirmed
its decision.
A recently reported decision of the Supreme Court of Swe-
den,' 9 allowing recovery by a Russian bank of a deposit in Swe-
den, would imply that this court has aligned itself with the Anglo-
American view despite the fact that Sweden has recognized the
Soviet government.
It will be noted in summary that there is a split between the
Anglo-American decisions on the one hand and the French, Ger-
man and Swiss on the other as to the legal theory applic-
able to the situation presented by the nationalized Russian com-
panies. The disagreement does not follow from recognition or
non-recognition of the Soviet government; that some continental
courts follow a somewhat stricter view of the applicability
of Soviet law in these cases than do the Anglo-American courts
is perhaps rather attributable to differences in legal system. But
the actual results of the decisions with respect to the disposition
of the assets do not appear to be as varied as are the theories
concerning the right of the corporations to sue. For, as will be
seen below, the effect granted to the Soviet decrees in jurisdic-
, Tribunal Federal, December 10, 1924 (1925) 52 CLUNET 488, 489.
48 March 11, 1925 (1925) JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 529.
49 A newspaper report printed in the ROUSKOE SLOVO of New York, April
10, 1930, asserts that the Paris branch of a Russian bank seeking to regain
a deposit in a Swedish bank was allowed recovery by the Supreme Court of
Sweden on the grounds that Soviet decrees were effective only within the
territories of the Soviet Republic.
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tions which acknowledge the dissolution of Russian corporations
is strictly limited, so that former owners will not be denied re-
covery of their property even where the corporation is deemed
to have been effectually dissolved.
RIGHTS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
The revolutionary upheaval that occurred in Russia resulted
in the complete disorganization of the normal life of Russian
corporations. Directors and shareholders were forced to sus-
pend their corporate activities. Corporate records were lost or
destroyed, share certificates were confiscated. In exile, surviv-
ing directors and shareholders have met and attempted to reor-
ganize themselves for the purpose of continuing to do businss,
or to recover the assets of the corporations in which they are in-
terested. Under these strained and unusual conditions, repre-
sentatives of the corporation come into court with no pretence
at strict compliance with all the requirements of their corporate
charter, by-laws, and the laws under which the corporation was
organized. Meetings of directors and shareholders are held, if
at all, away from the principal office; directors are frequently
holding over beyond their appointed term; shareholders have
difficulty in producing strict proof of their interest in the com-
pany; agents purport to act on the basis of powers granted by
boards of directors the members of which may have died or
disappeared long since.
Aside from the question as to the continued existence of a
corporate personality, then, there arises the difficult and more
practical task of determining when the officers or other inter-
ested parties who present themselves before the court have
made a sufficient showing of authority to be permitted to
represent the corporation in litigation.
Directors. The effect of non-compliance by the directors with
the provisions of the charter as to the place of meeting, terms
of office and similar provisions was brought out in the Stodda.rd
case where recovery by the directors was denied. In a later
case, however, another New York court appears to have taken
a more liberal view. In permitting directors to organize an
American company as the successors of the Russian company the
Appellate Division declared:
"Under the circumstances in the case at bar, while the general
powers of the directors of the Rossia company in Paris may be
open to question, yet it will be assumed that their powers con-
tinue at least to the extent of preserving the assets of the cor-
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poration and holding the same for the benefit of the corporation
and of its creditors." 60
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision was affirmed, the
court referring to the powers of the directors as follows:
"When old institutions have fallen and none which we will
recognize have succeeded, how shall we deal with foreign owners
of property within our jurisdiction? We cast aside rigid rules
made to control other conditions. We insist upon honest con-
duct, but when the morality of the proceedings satisfies us as a
court of equity, we will not obstruct the conservation of property
. . . It [the corporation] was half dead and half alive. We
make no effort to define the authority of its directors as such.
We do hold that these proscribed individuals fleeing from the
fury of the revolution retained the power to conserve property
in this country as far as the courts of New York can protect
it." 51
In the Mejdunarodny case the objections that the three sur-
viving directors had never been re-elected to office after the ex-
piration of their term and that the only meetings had been held
at Paris rather than Petrograd, as required by the charter, were
overruiled. Chief Judge Cardozo treated the question of the
authority of these directors to act for the company as follows:
"The directors who made the deposit in the name of the cor-
poration or continued it in that name now ask to get it back.
Either it must be paid to the depositor, acting by them, or it
must be kept here indefinitely. Either they must control the
custody, or for the present and the indefinite future it is not
controllable by any one. The defendant expresses the fear that
the money may be misapplied if the custody is changed. The
fear has its basis in nothing more than mere suspicion. The di-
rectors, men of honor presumably, will be charged with the
duties of trustees, and will be subject to prosecution, civil or
criminal, if those duties are ignored. The defendant is not re-
quired to follow the money into their hands and see how they
apply it. Its duty is to pay." 52
This decision, in agreement with the view of the lower court
in the Stoddard case,53 seems to have overcome former fears of
60 Fred S. James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 404, 409, 221
N. Y. Supp. 739, 744 (1st Dep't 1927).
5- 247 N. Y. 262, 270, 160 N. E. 364, 367 (1928).
52 Supra note 14, at 40, 170 N. E. at 486.
53 Supra ngte 6. This view had been held in Joint Stock Co. v. National
City Bank, 240 N. Y. 368, 148 N. E. 552 (1925). See Beha v. Second Rus-
sian Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 92, 232 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1st Dep't 1928), where
the directors were refused recovery on the ground that their terms of office
had expired. This decision was later reversed on the ground that directors
may legally appear before the court and suggest suitable means for the dis-
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the court, expressed in the reversal of the Stoddard case, that
to allow the directors recovery would be virtually permitting
them to use the property for any purpose they saw fit. As a
result of these cases, it may be said that at present in America
surviving directors will be regarded by the courts as entitled
to act, for the preservation of assets of the corporation, as trus-
tees for the shareholders; and that non-compliance by reason
of vis major with many of the technical charter requirements
will not be fatal to their case.
The English cases have likewise run into the problem of pass-
ing upon the authority adhering in the directors of nationalized
companies. While most of the suits in behalf of Russian com-
panies have been brought by agents of the company and local
managers, one case has arisen in which the problem of the rights
of the directors was presented squarely before the court. In
Worodn v. Huth - four fugitive directors out of an original
board of seven were allowed to recover a debt owed to the Rus-
sian company as "de facto" directors. Although the rights of
directors have been questioned in several cases where the issue
has not arisen directly,55 the conclusion to be drawn from the
English cases is that where directors appear in sufficient num-
ber, even though they have not complied strictly with the pro-
visions of the corporate charter with respect to meetings and
elections, the courts will construe their power to act almost as
liberally as will the American courts.
Prior to recognition of the Soviet government by France the
reconstitution of Russian companies in that country by trans-
plantation of the board of directors-o and the continuation of
business in complete disregard of the Soviet decrees was per-
mitted. Thus a draft signed by the directors of a bank in Russia
after the nationalization decrees was held to be enforceable
against the branch of the bank in Paris.5 ' The courts also ad-
mitted the right of directors to replace members of the board
by co-option if that process was performed by the proper
parties under Russian law.58
Following recognition, one of the obvious signs of the exis-
posal of the funds involved. Matter of Second Russian Ins. Co., 250 N. Y.
449, 166 N. E. 163 (1929).
54 Supra note 26.
55 Sea Ins. Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co. supra note 24 (a proceeding to garnish
the debt owed the Russian company) ; The "Jupiter," supra note 26, where
the court in allowing one of the plaintiffs, the French liquidator of the
Russian company, to recover, rejected the plea of the other plaintiff, the
directors of the company.
S Banque Russe pour le Commerce Etranger, Trib. Comm. Seine, Janu-
ary 16, 1922 (1923) 50 CLUNur 539.
s7 Kharon v. Banque Russe pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, cupra note 34.
5s Ibid. See also Vlasto v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, supra note 34.
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tence of a de facto Russian company in France has been the
presence of a functioning board of directors.59 Where a de facto
company has not been established, the directors can neither
sue 80 nor be sued 61 in their corporate capacity. In one case,
however, where assets of a Russian company in the United
States had been recovered by Russian directors, the French
court has taken jurisdiction over a claim which a creditor of the
Russian company sought to enforce against either the corpo-
ration or the directors as individuals. 02 The suggestion
has been made that the theory upon which the directors hold
over in France is the presumption that their powers are tacitly
renewed by the shareholders. In situations where such a theory
obviously becomes untenable an alternative is advanced; it is
argued that, provided the shareholders have not revoked their
authority, the directors have the power to conserve the corporate
assets so long as no court decides to the contrary. 3
Although in an early case 64 the rights of the directors were
sustained by a Swiss court even though their term of office
had expired, since the Hausner case,"' which found that Russian
corporations had been dissolved both in Russia and abroad, the
directors have no standing before the courts of that country. In
Germany the powers of the directors were not discussed in the
Ginsberg case - since the directors were not parties to'the suit,
but in holding that the Russian corporation had been dissolved
by the Soviet decrees the implication was clear that the directors
in Germany also have no standing in court.
Thus where the corporation is found to have been dissolved
by the Soviet government, the directors have no standing. But
where the corporation has not been held dissolved, it becomes a
question of judgment on the part of the court, applying broad
rules of equity rather than enforcing the technical requirements
of the charters of the corporations, to determine whether the
directors should be allowed to recover the assets in question in
the name of the corporation. The Mejduwarodny case sets out
the problem as follows: will the directors, such as they are, be
allowed to recover, or are the funds to remain for an indefinite
time without a claimant? The harshness of the latter alternative
seems somewhat mitigated, however, by those courts which,
59 Banque Russo-Asiatique, supra note 37.6 0 Banque de Sib~rie v. Vairon, supra note 39.
62 Kamenka and Epstein v. Cahn, Trib. Comm. Seine, January 11, 1927
(1927) 54 CLUNEr 362.
62 Khorosch v. Rossia, Kamenka et al., Cour d'appel de Paris, January
7, 1928 (1928) 55 CLUNET 687.
- Note by Tager (1928) 55 CLUNET 688.
4 Comptoir d' Escompte v. Sosnowice, supra note 46.
- Supra ndte 47.
e OSupra note 45.
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while not permitting the directors to recover, suggest some form
of guardianship of the assets for the benefit of the shareholders
and creditors.
Shareholders. Since the American courts have never contem-
plated that the Soviet government should be allowed to take pos-
session of the assets of Russian corporations in the United
States, the disposition of these assets resolves itself into the
question whether the directors should be given them to hold on
behalf of the corporation, or whether they should be allowed to
remain where they are, in the hands of debtors, on deposit in
banks, or in the possession of Insurance Commissioners, to be
held there for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors.
The latter view has prevailed in a few cases. Thus in the
Stoddard case, the court, in refusing to allow a recovery by the
directors, declared:
"Though this property in form belongs to the corporation, in
fact, if it has not been confiscated, the policy holders, creditors,
and shareholders are eventually entitled to it. Certainly it does
not belong to the directors to do with as they will." G"
The rights of the shareholders here appear to be set up as
against those of the directors acting in behalf of the corporation.
That the court has not taken such an approach very seriously,
however, is proved by the decision in the First Russian Inurance
Co. case, 8 where recovery of corporate property in the hands of
the Superintendent of Insurance was allowed by the directors of
a Russian company despite the decision in the Stoddard case.
The ground of the decision was that no danger existed of double
liability to the debtor in a foreign jurisdiction, as presumably
the Superintendent of Insurance had no funds abroad which
- Supra note 8, at 165, 147 N. E. at 708. See also Andre v. Beha, 211
App. Div. 380, 393, 208 N. Y. Supp. 65, 77 (2d Dep't 1925), where recovery
to an agent of the corporation was refused as it was felt "no protection
-whatsoever is given to the other stockholders' rights; and plaintiff, a min-
ority stockholder, is, by the judgment, made a custodian or practical re-
ceiver of the corporate property, without any security to insure a proper
liquidation of the company's assets for the benefit of those clearly entitled
thereto.' In affirming this decision the court declared: "As a stockholder
suing in a representative capacity in the right of the corporation he has
not made out a cause of action, since no waste of corporate assets is
threatened." 240 N. Y. 605, 606, 148 N. E. 724 (1925). A recent decision of
the Appellate Division, In re Beha (First Department, May 29, 1930),
denied recovery of the surplus funds of Russian insurance companies in the
hands of the State Department of Insurance to the exiled directors of the
companies. The right of the shareholders to these funds was indirectly
recognized, but distribution was to be suspended until the funds could be
-transmitted to a liquidator of the corporation at its domicile abroad.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
could be reached by the Soviet government. In the Mejdunar-
odny case the court also rejects the position of the Stoddard case
and allows recovery of the debt by the directors to be held in
trust for the shareholders. Thus it would seem that for purposes
of recovering assets in this country, the shareholders are
considered to be properly represented by the directors.
The only English case discussing the rights of the shareholders
at any length is the Woronin case which allowed recovery by di-
rectors of assets of the company in England. Here the share-
holders presented deposit receipts for some of the shares ac-
counted for. They had met in England following notice pub-
lished in the English press, the notice also having been sent to
Russia although no evidence of its publication was presented.
The court declared:
"I think the shareholders who have disengaged themselves
from the Russian jurisdiction are entitled to say that they are
still shareholders of an existing company and are entitled to the
benefit of any rights attaching to that status outside Soviet
dominion." 69
In companies which are recognized under the de facto theory
in France the shareholders apparently continue to enjoy the ordi-
nary privileges accorded them by the charter. In one case where
the shareholders sought to compel the directors to call a share-
holders' meeting, the court, after examining the charter with
care, ruled that it would enforce the shareholders' rights only
as they were there expressed ° It would seem that the share-
holders are allowed to participate in the distribution of the as-
sets of corporations that have been ordered to dissolve although
no cases bearing directly upon the question have been found;
certainly ordinary creditors of the companies have been given
protection.7 1
In Germany and Switzerland where the corporation is deemed
to have been dissolved, the courts nevertheless seem to recog-
nize the existence of a right in the shareholders to share in the
distribution of the assets within the forum. Thus in the Gins-
berg case the court, after denying that the Soviet government
had become entitled to the assets, appeared to suggest the alter-
native that they belonged to the shareholders.72 The Swiss
68First Russian Insurance Co. v. Beha, 240 N. Y. 601, 148 N. E. 722
(1925).
69Supra, note 26.
70 Banque Russo-Asiatique, Cour d'Appel de Paris, May 27, 1927 (1928)
55 CLUNmr 126.
-1 Khorosch v. Rossia, Kamenka et al., supra note 62.
72 "No definite assertions have been made by the parties in regard to the
question in whom the property of the bank would be vested, whether in
shareholders of the corporation or in other legal representatives, on dis-
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courts have also given indications that they consider the
creditors and shareholders entitled to the property.73
It thus appears that the real parties in interest, the creditors
and the shareholders, will be protected. Where the directors
are allowed to recover, on the assumption that the corporation
is a continuing entity, it is on the understanding that they hold
the funds for the creditors and shareholders. Where the direc-
tors are refused recovery there is a strong indication that the
shareholders might be more successful. By very different
routes the courts of countries that have or have not recognized
the Soviet government or the decrees of the Soviet government,
in the final analysis, arrive at much the same conclusion as to
who is entitled to the funds. The conclusion here reached is
strengthened by an examinatidn of the closely related problem
of the rights which the Soviet government has been able to
establish to the foreign assets of the nationalized corporations.
RIGHTS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
The rights of 'the Soviet government to the assets of nation-
alized Russian companies in this country have not been passed
upon directly by the American courts since, in the absence of
recognition, it has been denied the capacity to sue.7' In some
of the American cases, however, the question whether the
Soviet government can recover such assets in countries where
it is accorded recognition has played a significant part. For
the fear has been frequently expressed that a debtor who is com-
pelled to pay a debt to the representatives of a Russian corpora-
tion in the United States may be subjected to double liability if
he possesses assets in a country which has recognized the Soviet
government and given full extraterritorial effect to its confis-
catory decrees. Thus in the Stodd-ard case Judge Lehman
expressed this idea as follows:
solution under the Russian law which was in force until December 14, 1917."
Ginsberg v. Deutsche Bank, supra note 42.
7 In Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Autorite de
surveillance des tutelles de Geneve, Trib. Fed., November 26, 1925 (unpub-
lished, but discussed in Tiefenau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 161) the Fed-
eral Tribunal declared that it; could not be doubted that the shareholders
were interested in the disposition of the assets of the Geneva branch of
the Banque Internationale and further made the statement that the man-
aging director of the branch could be held responsible by the shareholders
or the creditors of the bank. Furthermore the Conseul d'Etat of Geneva in
a letter of February 20, 1925, made the statement that the assets of the
branch belonged either to the Peoples Bank (Soviet) or the shareholders.
bid. The former alternative was excluded in the Wilbusehewitsch dcaision,
inf a note 96, leaving only the latter as a possibility.
74 Suprm note 5.
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"May we regard as similarly remote the possibility of such a
second recovery in the courts of a foreign nation? . . We
recognize one source of law; most of the nations of Europe look
to another sovereign as its source . . .Our inability to protect
by our judgment this defendant against a second recovery upon
the same cause of action presents a strong consideration against
assuming jurisdiction in this action." -5
The extent to which these fears have proved to be well founded
therefore becomes an important consideration.
Title to property by virtue of confiscatory decrees of a foreign
state has been recognized by the courts in a limited category
of cases. Where a former owner of property confiscated in a
foreign country identifies such property in the forum in the
hands of someone holding it as an agent or purchaser from the
confiscating government and sues for its repossession on the
grounds of a tortious taking in the foreign country, it has been
held by American,70 English," German 78 and Italian 19 courts
that the claims of the former owners are invalid in all cases
where the foreign government has been recognized.8s
T5Supra note 8, at 167, 168, 147 N. E. at 708, 709.
7 0etjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1917)
(recovery by former owner of hides seized under requisition by Villa and
subsequently imported into the United States refused). See Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83 (1897).
n7 Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K. B. 532 (replevin of marked lumber of
plaintiff company seized in Russia and brought into England denied);
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] K. B. 718 (replevin of works of art
confiscated from plaintiff in Russia and sold in England denied). Houghton,
op. cit. supra note 7.
78 Caucasian Licorice Co. v. Katz, Landgericht, Hamburg, June 13, 1924
(1925) 1 OSTRECHT 165 (dispossessed owners of confiscated merchandise
unable to regain possession).
79 R. S. F. S. R. v. Rdmische Schwefelgesellschaft, Court of Cassation of
Italy, April 25, 1925 (1925) 1 OSTRECHT 178 (former owner could not re-
cover property confiscated in Russia when it was imported into Italy).8 0 There is some dispute as to what should happen to property confiscated
and brought into a country which has not recognized the confiscating govern-
ment. The lower court decision in Luther v. Sagor, supra note 77, allowed
the former owner to recover, the case being reversed following recognition.
Similarly, recovery by the former owners was allowed in Bouniatian v.
Soc. Optorg, Trib. Civil Seine, December 12, 1923 (1924) 51 CLUNm, 133
and Federazione italiana dei consorzi agrari di Piacenza v. Comm. per il
commercio estero del la R. S. F. S. R., Trib. Civil Roma, January 26, 1923
(1923) 75 GUIRISPRUDENZA ITALIANA I, 2, 131. The view is generally sup-
ported by European writers. L< revolution bolshevique et le statut juridique
des Russes (1924) 51 CLuNEur 5. The case of Underhill v. Hernadez, supra
note 76, however, does not appear to support the proposition. Chief Justice
Fuller, in rendering the opinion of the court declared: "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to, be
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At first. thought, in view of the rule that political recognition
"is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct
of the Government so recognized from the commencement of its
existence," "I it would appear that recognition is the sole and
conclusive factor in determining whether effect to decrees, what-
ever their nature, is to be given in a foreign country. This was
the implication of the Stoddrd case and it has been supported
by some commentators. Thus Air. Fraenkel writing in 1925
views recognition as of itself giving some interest to the
recognized government in the foreign property of nationalized
companies:
"There is grave danger, however, that as a result of such suits
property of nationalized corporations may come into the hands
of irresponsible persons, to the detriment, not only of the Soviet
Government, but also of creditors and stockholders not before
the court. Recognition of Soviet Russia in the near future will
further complicate such cases because of the retroactive effect
which will be given to such recognition." 82
But this is going much further than the holdings of the cases
warrant. The decisions cited above refer to property actually
seized in the foreign state; 83 the plaintiffs are former owners,
who are trying to upset the title of the defendants claiming un-
der the foreign government. In such a situation the courts have
held as legally valid the acts occurring abroad. In other words,
here they will not go behind the legality of the foreign
transaction,
But if the property in question has not been actually seized
by the foreign state because it has been located at all times
since the confiscatory legislation outside of that state, it is
quite a different matter. The plaintiff is the confiscating govern-
ment or someone claiming under it; the courts of the state of
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. Nor can the principle
be confined to lawful or recognized governments or to cases where redress
can manifestly be had through public channels." 168 U. S. at 252, 18 Sup.
Ct. at 84; cf. decision below, 65 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895). It is perti-
ment to note, however, that the Venezuelan government had been recognized
by the United States at the time the court rendered the decision, even
though it had not when the acts complained of by the plaintiff had occurred.
In Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 5, replevin of gold
belonging to the Soviet State Bank alleged by the plaintiff to have been
seized from it in Russia was refused. See also Borchard, The Valdty
Abroad of Acts of the Soviet Government (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 82.
s8 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra, note 76, at 302, 38 Sup. Ct. at 311.
2Fraenkel, op. cit. supra not, 7, at 566. See also Wobl, Op. CiL CLpra
note 44.
83 Trotter, Extraterritorial Operation, and Effect of Confiscatory Decrees
of the Soviet Government (1925) 3 N. C. L. REv. 88, discussing the older
cases on this point with reference to the effect of recognition.
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the forum are requested to give effect to the decrees of the for-
eign state by allowing the plaintiffs to seize the property located
in the forum. They are in fact asked to enforce the decrees
in the forum against property under the protection of the courts
of the forum. In this situation the courts have examined the
decrees in question, and, if they are contrary to the public policy
of the forum, they will not be enforced regardless of whether
recognition has or has not been accorded the foreign state. The
basis for this refusal is the exception in the conflict of laws of
"public order" or "public policy," 8- which Dicey has stated in its
broadest terms as follows:
"English Courts will not enforce a right otherwise duly ac-
quired under the law of a foreign country . . where the
enforcement of such right is inconsistent with the policy of
English law, or with the moral rules upheld by English law,
or with the maintenance of English political and judicial
institutions." 85
An American court has defined this rule as follows:
"The well known exception . . that the laws, which are
to be admitted in the tribunals of a country where they are not
made, are not to be injurious to the state, or the citizens of the
state, where they are so received . . ." 86
The exception of public order has been invoked in a wide
variety of situations,87 and particularly frequently in opposition
to claims based upon confiscatory legislation. The most famous
cases prior to the flood of litigation involving Russian corpora-
tions were those arising out of the confiscation of the property
and the dissolution of the order of the Carthusian monks by
the French government in 1901.
The religious order of the Carthusians was profitably engaged
84Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public
Order (1927) 21 AM. J. INT. LAw 238, 240: "The exception of public order
appears everywhere as the generally adopted rule to prevent inequitable
consequences of any theory, which admits the recognition of foreign laws."
85 DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1927) 27.
86 Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20, 23 (1816).
87 The Duke of Brunswick, overthrown by a revolution, fled to France
with an amount of personal property. A decree was issued by his successor
to the throne declaring him a spendthrift and naming a guardian over all
his property. The French court refused to give effect to the decreel in
France on the grounds that "its form, the authority from which it proceeds,
the person to whom it applies, the circumstances in which it was issued,
the reasons for its issuance, indicate its essentially political character." Lo
duc de Cambridge v. Le duc de Brunswick, Cour Royale, January 16, 1836
(1836) SEY II, 70, 78. Where by a special decree the Emperor of Russia
forbade Count Potocki to dispose of his property, the French courts refused
to enforce this order against the count who owned real property in France.
Rosa Catana v. Potocki, Trib. Seine, May 7, 1873 (1875) 2 CLUNET 20.
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in the manufacture of a liqueur known as "Chartreuse" by a
secret process protected by trade marks in many foreign coun-
tries. Expelled from France they re-established themselves in
Italy and Spain and continued to manufacture their liqueur.
The French liquidator sought to have the patent rights of the
order transferred to himself. He was opposed by the monks
who sought to preserve their property outside of France. The
Federal Tribunal of Switzerland denied the claim of the French
liquidators, giving as its grounds the following:
"It is not necessary in order to support this view to invoke the
odious character of the Law of 1901 . . . It is sufficient to recall
that political acts have validity only within the country where
they are accomplished and their recognition in foreign countries
is opposed, in the absence of special circumstances, to the prin-
ciple of sovereignty of that state . . . Admitting even that
the French Law of 1901 had certain effects in private law, it
nevertheless remains true that they would not be recognized
in a state whose public law does not permit the confiscation of
the property of individuals." F,
The House of Lords 69 took the same view as the Tribunal
Federal of Switzerland but based its refusal to give title to the
trade mark in England to the French liquidator and those claim-
ing under him upon the ground that the decree in question had
no extraterritorial effect because there had been no intent that
it should be so regarded.' °
So, in states which have recognized the Soviet government
the exception of public order has been employed to prevent the
seizure of the property of Russian nationals and corporations
located in the forum by the Soviet government claiming title
under the confiscatory decrees. The most important case to test
the title of the Soviet government to such property, arose out
of the liquidation in France of the Ropit Company, a Russian
navigation company."
The suit was brought by the Soviet Ambassador against the
provisional administrator of the Ropit Company, who had, previ-
88 Compagnie fermi~re de la Grande Chartreuse v. Rey, Tribunal Federal,
July 11, 1913, 39 R. 0. II. 640, 652. See Pillet, La. Marque Chartreuse
(1907) 3 REv. DE DR. Ir. Praiv. 525, 533. The Law of 1901 is characterized
as a "political law, having no effect abroad . . . it is not to be doubted
that this law is impressed with an odious nature which is found in con-
fiscatory laws. It must produce no effect abroad."
89 Lecouturier v. Rey, [1910] A. C. 262.
9 A German court allowed the liquidator to recover on the theory that in
Germany a foreigner can only register the trade mark he has in his own
country. It is the property in his country that is protected by the German
trade mark. Lacouturier v. Rey, Trib. Civ. Hamburg, February 23, 1906
(1907) 3 REV. DE DR. INT. PRIv. 415.
91 Etat Russe v. Ropit, Trib. Comm. Marseille, April 23, 1925 (1925) 52
CLUNr 391.
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ous to the recognition of the Soviet government, been appointed
by a French Court at the request of shareholders, refugee direc-
tors and other interested parties to administer the assets of the
company. The Ambassador demanded that the property of the
Ropit Company situated in France be turned over to him on
the grounds that the decree of January 26, 1918, nationalizing all
the property of the Ropit Company, must, in view of the recog-
nition accorded the Soviet government by the French govern-
ment, be valid in the eyes of the French court. The lower court
denied the plaintiff recovery for the reason that the decree of
nationalization, whose application in France was in question,
gave no compensation to former owners of the property and
was therefore confiscatory in character. The enforcement of
such a decree in France, it was felt by the court, would be con-
trary to French public policy. It was pointed out, moreover,
that the Soviet government had itself, by an official circular of
the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, stated that "the legisla-
tion of each country, with regard to property rights, is applicable
only within the territorial limits of that country. "
The Soviet government thereupon countermanded its circular
and took an appeal. The appeal, however, was rejected by the
Court d'Aix which declared:
"It is inadmissible that the French state in recognizing the
Soviet Government de jure is ipso facto precluded from refusing
to apply any of the provisions of [Russian] law which seem to
it contrary to its own conception of national public order." 92
The case was appealed again by the Soviet government to the
Court of Cassation, the court of last resort. In denying the ap-
peal, this court reviewed the points raised in the lower courts
and entered in greater detail into considerations of public
policy:
"Whereas in principle the courts of one state, when they have
to pass upon a legal question which has its roots in foreign legis-
lation, must apply foreign law, this rule is obligatory only where
the application of foreign law or the recognition of rights ac-
quired under foreign law do not conflict with the principles or
the application of domestic laws essential to the maintenance of
public order. . . . Whereas the Soviet decree of January 26,
1918 nationalized the Russian mercantile fleet without just com-
pensation being granted to the dispossessed proprietors, this
decree thereby instituted a mode of seizing property which
French courts cannot recognize. . . .1 3
This decision of the highest tribunal of France thus seems defin-
92 December 23, 1925 (1926) 53 CLUNE~r 667, 668.
93 March 5, 1928 (1928) 55 CLUNErr 674.
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itely to have rejected the enforcement of confiscatory foreign
legislation against property outside tha jurisdiction of the Soviet
state at the time of the decrees and within the jurisdiction of the
French Courts at the time of suit.
A similar decision was rendered in England where a vessel
belonging to the same navigation company, which had left Rus-
sian waters before the Soviet government had actually seized it,
was subsequently given over to the Soviet Embassy in London by
the master of the vessel without authorization of his principal,
the old Russian company. The ship was then sold by the Soviet
government to the defendant. The court allowed the plaintiff to
recover the vessel from the defendant on behalf of the Russian
company, declaring in the course of its decision:
"If the Jupiter was not within the territory of the R. S. F. S.
R. I do not see how the mere passing of a decree could transfer
the property . . ."
Again, in another case involving a debt owed to a Russian in-
surance company, the King's Bench declared:
"Effective as such legislation may be within the limits of
Russian territory, it cannot determine the ownership of prop-
erty locally situated in this country, such as debts owing from
debtors here." 1
In the recent case of Wilbuscheewitch v. Zurich, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal reasserted, in substance, the objections
to foreign confiscatory legislation voiced in the Chartreuse
decision:
"Swiss law regards as contrary to public order and morals
the appropriation by the Russian State of the assets of the Rus-
sian banks without the assumption of their liabilities guaranteed
by these assets, and neither the Russian State nor the Peoples
Bank can be regarded as the successor of the Banque de Com-
merce de Sibdrie in its relations with the Banque Federal." 11
Similarly, the most recent decision of the German courts ex-
plicitly declares that any appropriation of the property of a
bank by the Russian state by virtue of the confiscation of the
assets of the former banks by nationalization, "cannot be recog-
nized by reason of Art. 30 of the EGBGB." "I A few scattered
94 The "Jupiter," [1927] P. D. 122, 144. See supra note 26.
95 Sedgwick, Collins & Co. v. Russia Ins. Co., 22 LI. L. R. 475, 476 (1925)
gr Tribunal Federal, July 13, 1925 (1926) 53 CLUxur 1110, 1113.
- Ginsberg v. Deutsche Bank, supra note 42. Article 30 of the EGBGB:
"The application of a foreign law is excluded if the application would con-
travene good morals, or the purpose of a German law."
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cases indicate that the courts of other countries have arrived
at substantially the same result.08
Writers are in conflict as to the importance thab should be
accorded the theory of public order. Some distinguish the Soviet
nationalization measures from the confiscatory decrees dealt with
in the older cases on the ground that the Soviet decrees are not
purely political acts but economic measures and the "foundation
of the entire private and public legal order of Soviet Russia." '"
This consideration, however does not appear to have weighed
very heavily with the courts. The one decision found out of line
with these referred to above was rendered by a tribunal of the
Georgian Republic shortly before that Republic became absorbed
by the Soviet Union.1 , The case is more a curiosity than a
warning.
It would appear from the foregoing that the New York Court
of Appeals was quite justified in the Mejdunardny case, both
by the practice of foreign courts and by authority, in dismissing
the danger of double liability as a determinative consideration.
As Chief Judge Cardozo remarked:
"The danger [of double liability] is not imminent, as the course
of events since our decision in Russian Reinsurance Co. v.
Stoddard sufficiently attests. France recognizes the Soviet Re-
public as a member of the family of nations. Yet till now at
least, it has failed to give effect to titles having their basis
in decrees of confiscation . . . Negligible is the risk that by
any judgment in its domicile it will be compelled to pay again.
Whatever risk it runs abroad, is' one that it assumed as part of
its business of a bank." 101
There remains the somewhat improbable contingency that fol-
lowing recognition, American courts would feel obligated to al-
low the Soviet government to recover from local debtors sums
98 The Supreme Court of Denmark has held that the Russian Church in
Copenhagen which belonged to a religious corporation nationalized by Soviet
decree, despite de jure recognition of that government, would not be placed
in the possession of representatives of the Soviet government. The Council
of the Russian Orthodox Community in Copenhagen v. The Legation of the
R. S. F. S. R. in Copenhagen, Supreme Court of Denmark, October 22, 1925
(1925-26) ANN. DIG. OF INT. L. CASES 24. See also the Swedish decision
smpra note 49.
99 Wohl, op. cit. supra note 44, at 635. Dr. Wohl's view is opposed by
Robinowitsch, op. cit. supra note 44. See also Champcommunal, op. cit. supra
note 34.
100 Ships of a nationalized Russian company were sold by the Russian
company's agents.during the revolution. On arrival at Batoum, the Soviet
Consul claimed them by virtue of the nationalization decree. Recovery by
the Soviet Consul was allowed. S.S. George and Edwich, Consul of the
R. S. F. S. R. v. Italian Consul, Republic of Georgia, October, 1922 (1923)
BULL. INS. INTERMEmum INT. 336.
101 Supra note 14, at 39, 170 N. E. 485.
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owed to Russian nationalized corporations. The Stoddard case,
however, was careful to point out that the responsibility for
making all Soviet actions valid would be upon the State De-
partment and suggests that unconditional recognition is not the
only road open to executive officials:
"Nor will we assume that the State Department will ever en-
ter into such relations with the Soviet Government as might
compel our courts to enforce such a claim."
Thus either by treaty in granting recognition, if indeed recog-
nition is ever granted to the Soviet government, or by the proper
application of the exception of public order, such as is suggested
above, the danger of double liability in the forum may be
successfully avoided.
Conclusion. From this brief survey of the decisions, it would
appear that the problem of the effect to be granted Soviet legisla-
tion has been solved by the courts in a variety of ways. Any
criticism of the theories employed must take into consideration
the peculiar nature of the issues. The problem is really, though
it may not be admitted, to give the least possible extraterritorial
effect to Soviet legislation which is contrary to the public policy
of the forum. It is agreed that the Soviet government is not
entitled to recover the assets of the nationalized Russian cor-
porations abroad. Why does it not follow that where the debt is
admitted the plaintiff corporations must be allowed to recover?
Certainly no court can honestly decry the demoralizing effects of
Soviet legislation on the one hand and sanction an equally un-
justified confiscation of the corporate property within the
forum by its debtors on the other. Yet this is, in effect, the result
that flows from denying to the corporation the right to sue.
Anglo-American courts have in most cases avoided such a result.
The English expedient of denying that the decrees by their
terms dissolved the corporations is somewhat unsatisfactory since
it leaves the door open to legislation that would, by its terms,
have such legal effect, a situation which would require the courts,
if they were to deny it effect, to fall back on some other theory.
The American doctrine, as enunciated by Chief Judge Cardozo,
really goes deeper into the roots of the question. If it is contrary
to the public policy of the forum to aid in carrying out a whole-
sale dissolution and confiscation of assets of corporations outside
of Russia, the courts should extend the exception of public order
to refuse effect to such decrees both in respect to dissolution and
confiscation, whether the state promulgating them has or has
102 Supra note 8, at 166, 147 N. E. at 708.
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not been recognized. Once this step has been taken and the
corporation is regarded as continuing in the forum for pur-
poses of suit, the only problem remaining is for the court to
determine that the party plaintiffs, directors, agents or share-
holders of the corporation, appear in good faith and are the best
available representatives of what remains of the corporation. It
is approximately this attitude which has been adopted in the
recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals.
